Nuclear energy has quietly returned to the climate conversation. Not as a slogan, and not as a universal comeback story, but as a practical question: if the world needs to cut emissions quickly, where does nuclear fit?
The answer is complicated. Nuclear power is one of the lowest-carbon sources of electricity available at scale. Once operating, a plant produces large amounts of power with almost no direct carbon emissions. Today it provides roughly ten percent of global electricity and about a quarter of the world’s low-carbon power. That contribution is significant in any serious decarbonization pathway.
At the same time, nuclear carries distinctive risks and trade-offs. Accidents, though rare, are high-impact and deeply unsettling. Waste management remains politically sensitive. Construction costs can escalate, and projects can take years to complete. Some countries have decided those risks outweigh the benefits. Germany’s nuclear exit is one example.
So what is actually happening globally?
More than sixty reactors are currently under construction worldwide, with over one hundred additional projects in advanced planning. The most striking shift is geographic. Nuclear power is not disappearing, but who is building and why is changing.
Asia now leads new construction. China has roughly two dozen reactors being built and has connected dozens more to the grid over the past decade. At the same time, China is installing more solar capacity than any other country. It is not choosing between renewables and nuclear. It is deploying both. The strategy appears straightforward: reduce coal where possible while ensuring the grid remains stable for a large industrial economy.
India presents a similar pattern. Electricity demand is rising quickly as more households and industries connect to the grid. Solar is expanding rapidly, but India is also building new nuclear units. Policymakers there have made clear that variable renewable energy alone may not support long-term economic growth.
This introduces an important concept often called “firm power.” In plain terms, it means electricity you can rely on even when the weather isn’t cooperating. As more electric vehicles, factories, and data centers plug into the grid, maintaining that reliability becomes more complex. Nuclear is one of the few low-carbon sources capable of providing large volumes of steady output.
Europe’s story is more varied. France already operates one of the lowest-carbon electricity systems in the world because about seventy percent of its power comes from nuclear. Many of its reactors are aging, so the government has approved plans to build at least six new ones. The goal is not expansion for its own sake, but preserving a largely low-carbon system as older plants retire.
Poland, by contrast, has relied heavily on coal. It has signed agreements to build its first nuclear plant as part of a broader effort to reduce emissions and limit exposure to imported fuels. For Poland, nuclear represents structural change rather than maintenance.
In the United States, two large reactors recently entered commercial operation after years of delay. Their completion demonstrated that large projects are still possible, even if difficult. Meanwhile, the country is experimenting with smaller reactor designs that aim to reduce cost and construction risk.
The United Arab Emirates offers a particularly clear case. It built four reactors at the Barakah site in just over a decade. Nuclear now supplies roughly a quarter of its electricity. For the UAE, the objective was to secure a substantial block of clean, always-on power within a defined timeframe.
Taken together, these examples show a shift rather than a revival in the dramatic sense. Nuclear growth is concentrated in specific regions. It is often paired with large-scale renewable expansion. And it is framed less as a standalone solution than as one component in a diversified system.
For climate policy, this matters. Speed, cost, and public trust determine whether nuclear can meaningfully contribute to emission reductions. If projects are too slow or too expensive, their climate value diminishes. If safety standards are weak, public support erodes. Those constraints are real.
Yet the data also shows that many governments, facing rising electricity demand and pressure to cut emissions, are not removing nuclear from their options. Instead, they are recalibrating how it fits into broader energy strategies.
The nuclear map is moving eastward, not vanishing. Understanding that shift does not require uncritical support. It simply requires recognizing that in the global effort to decarbonize, nuclear remains part of the equation, debated, contested, but still being built.